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I. INTRODUCTION
It was not too long ago that “no taxation without representation”1 unified
the American colonies to declare their independence from Great Britain. A
simple desire for a voice in government empowered the political movement
which laid the foundation for the Democratic Republic inhabitants of the
United States enjoy today.2 The signers of the Declaration of Independence
pledged their lives, fortunes, and honor to a movement premised on
representation in government.3 The importance of the right to cast a ballot has
been increasingly recognized since the Declaration of Independence.4
Specifically, the United States Constitution grants citizens the ability to vote
without discrimination in four amendments but does not expressly confer a
right to vote.5 The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the denial of the right to
vote on the basis of race.6 The Nineteenth Amendment grants the right to vote
to women.7 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prevents the use of a poll tax in
all elections.8 Lastly, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment grants the right to vote to
United States citizens who are at least eighteen years of age.9 While
qualifications are generally left to individual states, Article One, Section Two of
the Constitution mandates that the qualifications to vote in federal elections be
the same as the requirements to vote in the largest branch of a state’s
legislature.10
But while our Constitution protects the ability to vote, significant legal
protections ensuring the accuracy of a vote are lacking. Technological
innovations and an emphasis on efficiency in elections has only exacerbated the
problem. Since the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002,
every state incentivized the utilization of an electronic voting machine in its
election process.11 In reaction to the 2000 Florida voting system debacle,
Congress passed HAVA, allocating over three billion dollars to states for
1 NCC Staff, On the Day: No taxation without representation (Oct. 7, 2016), http://constitution
center.org/blog/250-eyars-ago-today-no-taxation-withough-representation/.
2 Id.
3 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
4 Garrett Epps, Voting: Right or Privilege?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/voting-right-or-privilege/262511/.
5 Id.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
10 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 7.
11 HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20906 (2006)).
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purchasing and implementing electronic voting machines to improve the
electoral process.12
In addition to allocating funding for technological improvements, HAVA
also created an independent government agency to assist in certification and
testing of voting systems known as the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC).13 The EAC is further tasked with providing voluntary guidelines on
compliance with HAVA, after consultation with various election officials and
stakeholders across the country which implement variable (albeit legal) electoral
policies.14 However, HAVA left the manner in which electronic voting
machines were implemented to individual states and thus left nearly complete
discretion to states to comply with the voluntary guidelines.15 Additionally,
certification responsibilities are shared both by states and the federal
government to safeguard the effective operation of these voting systems, but
detailed results of the testing is not publicly available.16 The certification of
these machines only mandates testing “a baseline of features, controls, and
performance that a system should exhibit as part of an overall security strategy,”
and many federally certified machines have later malfunctioned.17
Thus, the EAC guidelines possess little authority in achieving the goals of
HAVA. Former head of the EAC appointed by President Bush, DeForest
Soaries called “ ‘charade’ ” and “claim[ed] that he had been deceived by both
the White House and Congress” during his tenure, stating that “this country is
ripe for stealing elections and for fraud.”18
Despite its drawbacks, HAVA did facilitate slight regulation. Soon after the
bill’s passage, the EAC in conjunction with the National Institute of Standards
and Technology crafted standards for electronic voting machines; however,
compliance with these standards, in addition to testing and certification of these
machines, is conducted by private companies referred to as Independent
Testing Authorities (ITAs).19 Furthermore, the results of the tests conducted
Id.
United States Electronic Assistance Commission, Help America Vote Act, https://www.eac.
gov/about_the_eac/help_america_vote_act.aspx (last visited July 1, 2017).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 ERIC A. FISCHER & KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33190, THE DIRECT
RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (DRE) CONTROVERSY: FAQS AND MISPERCEPTIONS 4
(2005).
17 Id. at 10.
18 Victoria Collier, How to Rig an Election: The G.O.P. Aims to Paint the Country Red, HARPER’S
MAG. (Nov. 2012), http://harpers.org/archive/2012/11/how-to-rig-an-election/?single=1.
19 Brian J. Miller, The Right to Participate, the Right to Know, and Electronic Voting in Montana, 69
MONT. L. REV. 371, 378 (2008).
12
13
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by the ITAs are themselves proprietary, thereby protecting both the ITAs and
the electronic voting system manufacturers under trade secret laws.20 The
testing results, plans, reports, recommendations for security measures, and
electronic voting system reliability are inaccessible by the public.21 If a security
risk is discovered by the ITA relating to the vulnerability or reliability of the
electronic voting machine, the ITA may write a report, “but only a small group
of appointed individuals and the private vendor, not the general public, have
access to it.22 While the private companies essentially only have the burden of
notifying the government of any impropriety in the security measures, these
companies do not always meet this obligation.23
A. INFORMATION ON ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS

Beginning in the 1960s, computers and other software were first utilized in
elections to “tabulate votes recorded on punch-card ballots.”24 Generally,
individuals record their vote by “punching out a perforated hole with a stylus or
pen,” and the computer ballot box tabulates the vote according to position of
the perforated hole and total number of votes in that position.25
As technology developed, three additional basic types of voting equipment
developed in the United States: Optical Scan Paper Ballot Systems
(manufactured by Diebold), Direct Recording Electronic Systems (DRE)
(manufactured by Sequoia and ES&S), and Ballot Marking Devices and
Systems.26
In optical scan systems, voters record their vote for a candidate or issue by
“filling in an oval, completing an arrow, or filling in a box.”27 Many states
utilize a paper record feature which allows for some of the DREs to “be
equipped with Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPAT) printers that allow the voter
to confirm their selections on an independent paper record before recording
Id. at 372.
Id. at 378.
22 Id. at 378–79.
23 Id. at 379–80 (describing an experience in Indiana where ES&S installed unapproved
software into the machines, and rather than notifying election officials, attempted to deceive the
election officials and cover up the misfeasance by “reinstalling older, certified software ‘under the
guise of routine maintenance’ ”).
24 Stephanie Philips, Commentary: The Risks of Computerized Election Fraud: When Will Congress
Rectify a 38-Year-Old Problem?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2006).
25 Id. at 1124–25.
26 Voting Equipment in the United States, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION, https://www.
verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/(last visited July 1, 2017).
27 Id.
20
21
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their votes into computer memory,” thereby preserving a paper trial which can
be observed in audits in accordance with that state’s laws.28
In 2003, leading electronic voting machine manufacturers aligned with the
Information Technology Association of America to form the Election
Technology Council (ETC).29 With a goal to “raise the profile” of electronic
voting and to identify security risks and technological malfunctioning, the
association contains three major companies: Diebold, Sequoia, and Election
Systems and Software (ES&S).30 These companies’ products are utilized
throughout the United States and receive much of the spotlight surrounding
electronic voting system criticism.31
Diebold is an optical scan voting system that records votes and tabulates
total vote count in one unit called “The AccuVote-OS.”32 Voters use a pen
provided by the polling station and fill in an oval for their preferred candidate.33
If they wish to cast a write-in vote, voters must record that desire by marking an
oval, or they must write the name of a write-in candidate.34 Upon filling out the
ballot, the voter takes it to the Accuvote-OS and the machine will record the
selections. If an individual recorded too many votes in an individual contest,
which is referred to as an “over-vote,” the machine will allow the voter to
correct their marks.35 The only person to handle the ballot throughout this
process is the voter.36
Sequoia manufactures a touch screen direct-recording electronic voting
machine known as the “Sequoia AVC Edge.”37 Voters insert a “smart-card”
into the machine which is issued by the poll worker and activates the machine.38
Utilizing a 15-inch LCD touchscreen to navigate the ballot and record their
votes, voters cast their ballot on a smart-card, and the machine records votes on
Id.
Carrie Jean Del Valle, Historical Timeline of Electronic Voting Machines and Technology, MEDIUM,
https://medium.com/@carriedelvalle23/historical-timeline-of-electronic-voting-machines-and-te
chnology-8a17f198f86.
30 Id.
31 Joel Roberts, Can Voting Machines Be Trusted?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 11, 2003, 3:11 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/can-voting-machines-be-trusted/.
32 Premier/Diebold (Dominion) AccuVote DS, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION, https://
www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/premier-diebold/accuvote-os/ (last visited
July 1, 2017).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Sequoia (Dominion) AVC Edge, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION, https://www.verified
voting.org/resources/voting-equipment/sequoia/avc-edge/ (last visited July 1, 2017).
38 Id.
28
29
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internal flash memory cards.39 Upon making their votes, the smart-card is
returned to a poll worker.40 When the polls close, a poll worker transfers the
vote tabulation information from the machine’s internal flash memory card, and
the information is taken to a central voter tabulation facility.41 These machines
may be activated to provide for a Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPT) whereby
the voter may confirm his choices by observing a paper receipt.42
In 2007, the California Secretary of State, Debra Bowen, conducted a
mandatory statutory review of the voting tabulation systems utilized by
California’s polling precincts. The study reached three critical conclusions: (1)
the certification standards of Sequoia machines were inadequate; (2) the Sequoia
security measures were severely inadequate and could lead to questioning of the
integrity of the election; and (3) the Sequoia machines suffer from numerous
programming errors which could exacerbate the security concerns of the
machines.43 These security concerns include susceptibility to outside hacking
whereby a motivated individual can easily circumvent the security measures and
gain access to the machine’s network.44
ES&S manufactures a DRE electronic voting machine similar to the Sequoia
AVC Edge.45 Utilizing an easily accessible touch screen interface and recording
votes on an internal flash memory card, the ES&S “iVotronic” voting machine
works similarly to a modern ATM whereby the voter manually selects their
choices after the machine has been activated remotely from a supervisor
terminal, known as the Personal Electronic Ballot (PEB), by a poll worker.46
Like the Sequoia AVC Edge, the iVotronic allows the option for VVPT
pending whether the State has implemented such auditing procedures, but that
choice is entirely deferential to the state legislature and will not be possible
unless that feature has been requested and installed.47 Unlike the Sequoia AVC
Edge, which prints voter results after they have completed the entire process,
Id.
Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 State of California Secretary of State, WITHDRAWAL OF APPROVAL OF SEQUOIA VOTING
SYSTEMS, INC., WINEDS V 3.1.012/AVC EDGE/INSIGHT/OPTECH 400-C DRE & OPTICAL SCAN
VOTING SYSTEM AND CONDITIONAL RE-APPROVAL OF USE OF SEQUOIA VOTING SYSTEMS, INC.,
WINEDS V 3.1.012/AVC EDGE/INSIGHT/OPTECH 400-C DRE & OPTICAL SCAN VOTING
SYSTEM 2–5 (Oct. 25, 2007).
44 Id. at 4.
45 Electronic Systems and Software (ES&S) iVotronics, VERIFIED VOTING FOUNDATION,
https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/ess/ivotronic/.
46 Id.
47 Id.
39
40
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the iVotronic records each change the voter records, printing simultaneously that
choice on a paper receipt that the voter can observe.48 However, the security
concerns of the iVotronic are especially compelling. Researchers recently
discovered that the iVotronic had substantial vulnerabilities with one of its front
magnetically-switched bidirectional infrared (IrDA) ports on the front of the
machine and the memory devices utilized to access the machine.49 Using that
port and a PDA with a downloaded “PEB emulator,” an individual could
acquire access with ease.50 Consequently, a voter who simply brings a magnet
and a PDA could conceivably gain access to the machine’s internal mechanisms
or the poll supervisor’s PEB and thereby obtain sensitive voter information and
the opportunity to manipulate vote tabulation results.51
Electronic voting systems have been received with variable criticisms, while
proponents argue that the machinery is incredibly secure, reliable, and flexible
to the needs of an individual voter.52 This Note will argue, however, electronic
voting systems, as regulated today, give too much power over public elections
to their private manufacturers.53 Additionally, electronic voting machines such
as DREs are susceptible to outside hacking and do not allow for reliable
verification of votes.54 Before passing HAVA, members of Congress attempted
to pass amendments to the Act to ensure there were paper trails in case of
technological failure, but neither passed.55
This Note will explore specific electoral events in places like Georgia with
scattered reports throughout polling precincts in rural counties that the
machines were “flipping” the vote to a different candidate in 2016, regardless of

Id.
Kim Zetter, Report: Magnet and PDA Sufficient To Change Votes on Voting Machine, WIRED (Dec.
17, 2007, 8:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/12/report-magnet-a/.
50 Id.; see Fig. 7.1.
51 Zetter, supra note 49; see Fig. 7.1.
52 Do Electronic Voting Machines Improve the Voting Process?, http://votingmachines.procon.org/
view.answers.php?questionID=001290 (last updated Jan. 27, 2017, 10:28 AM).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Individual Liberties and Intellectual Property Protection – Proprietary Software
in Digital Electronic Voting Machines: The Clash Between a Private Right and a Public Good in an
Oligopolistic Market, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 689, 702–03 (2009) (citing S.
1487, 110th Cong. (2007) (“Senate bill ‘[t]o amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require
an individual, durable, voter-verified paper record under title III of such Act.’ ”)); H.R. REP. NO.
110-154, at 2 (2007) (“House Report accompanying ‘[a] bill to amend the Help America Vote Act
of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title III of such Act, and for
other purposes.’ ”).
48
49
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the voter’s selection.56 Officials eventually concluded that the malfunctioning
of the Bryan County machine occurred because “the county did not properly
conduct logic and testing on [the machine]” to confirm that it would accurately
capture a voter’s choice.57
But the solution to resolving these deficiencies with electronic voting
machines are complex. Trade secret law prevents electronic voting system
manufacturers from divulging information on the proprietary software within
these machines as long as certain requirements are met. While this does not
prevent independent discovery of the software by a member of the public, this
Note will elaborate on the substantial power these companies possess in
dictating the outcome of the electoral process. Specifically, according to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), as a member of the
World Trade Organization, the United States must provide trade secret
protection for companies that qualify.58
This Note explores electoral fraud history, statutory law, case law, and
current issues painting doubt on the accuracy of the modern electoral system.
Part II will discuss the specific instances of ballot fraud, HAVA’s role in
shaping the electronic voting system landscape, specific instances of critical
electronic voting machine malfunctioning in elections, the public’s response to
these events, and recent events during the 2016 Presidential cycle.
Part III will discuss previously introduced solutions which, whether
theoretical or actually implemented, fail to resolve the larger problem. This
Note will then use specific examples from other areas of law to advocate the
adoption of burden-shifting which will provide increased access to the
electronic voting machines while simultaneously preserving the protection of a
manufacturer’s proprietary voting software under the UTSA. Part III will
introduce burden-shifting’s application to cases involving electronic voting
systems and discuss Dr. Stein’s efforts in Michigan and Pennsylvania during the
2016 presidential cycle. Part III will then make the argument for shifting the
burden of proof. In Part IV, this Note will conclude that by shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant after the plaintiff has made a sufficient evidentiary
showing, courts can guarantee the accuracy of an election, and individuals will
have the novel opportunity to hold electronic voting machine companies
accountable for the malfunctioning of their machines.
56 Kristina Torres, Georgia Voting Machine Suspected of ‘Flipping’ Presidential Votes, ATL-J. CONST.
(Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/georgia-voting-machin
e-suspected-flipping-presidential-votes/woKEUgpDDEyaw9o4J318XJ/.
57 Id.
58 Trade Secret Policy, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.
gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/trade-secret-policy (last visited July 1, 2017).
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B. TRADE SECRETS APPLICATION

While these machines undoubtedly provide efficient returns on voting
information and ease in calculating the percentage of votes cast for candidates
and referendums, the technology still remains imperfect and prone to
malfunctioning. Furthermore, the machines are manufactured by a small yet
powerful number of manufacturers.59 The solution seems simple: open the
machine, test its software, and ensure that it did not malfunction. However,
because of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) adopted by forty-eight
states, this solution is not feasible.60 Section 1.4 of the UTSA ensures that
manufacturers do not willingly have to provide information about their
software in these machines, thereby preventing an audit of their results.61
Specifically, because the software is “not being generally known to and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means,” it represents economic value to
the manufacturers and thereby is protected under the UTSA.62 The most
compelling reason manufacturers have for prohibiting inspection of these
machines is that by placing their software into the public, the manufacturers
lose the protections under the UTSA.63 In sum, proprietary information
protected under trade secret law is premised on three characteristics: “(1) not
generally known to the public; (2) confers economic benefit to the company
specifically because it is not generally known how” to manufacture the product;
and (3) reasonable efforts may be used to maintain secrecy.64
Trade secret law’s rationale is based on the notion that inventors and
scientists will be more likely to pour significant resources and time into the
development of their products if it is guaranteed that they will retain the
economic value derived from its creation.65 The law’s vague, ambiguous nature
allows the protections to apply to variable products within the intellectual
property realm—essentially any discrete knowledge or information may be
claimed to be a trade secret.66 While the trade secret protection does not
Roberts, supra note 31.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, as amended
1985).
61 Id. § 1.4.
62 Id. § 1.4(i).
63 Id. (see Comment to § 1).
64 Paul Holly, Trade Secrets and Election Companies: Private Companies in Government Elections,
IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/11/03/trade-secrets-and-elec
tion-companies-the-use-of-equipment-manufactured-by-private-companies-in-government-electi
ons/id=46002/.
65 Id.
66 Id.
59
60
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prevent inventors from independently discovering a means to reproduce
something protected under trade secret law, individuals and entities relying on
trade secret law to protect their proprietary information enjoy the protection
indefinitely—there is no temporal limit to its duration.67
In 1996, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act to allow public
access to government information.68 Ensuring public trust in government was
seemingly vital to Congress, but ensuring the integrity of elections was not a
priority. Thus, the act contains exceptions for trade secrets to protect sensitive
public and private information and interests.69 Furthermore, disclosing
information to the government, such as information surrounding the source
code of the electronic voting machine, does not vitiate the trade secret
protections; specifically, the fourth exception to the Freedom of Information
Act allows “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential” to be exempt from public
disclosure requests.70
Proponents of amending the trade secret laws to allow access to the
machines and disclosure of the software within should not expect to celebrate
anytime soon. Congressman Hank Johnson of Georgia’s fourth district recently
displayed the bipartisan efforts to protect and bolster federal trade secret law by
recently introducing the VOTE Act of 2016 “to amend the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 to make improvements to voting system technology, election
official training, and protecting voting system source code.”71 While the bill did not
pass during the 114th Congress, the gesture is symbolic of the struggle electoral
system reformers endure when attempting to hold the manufacturers
accountable in the public domain.
Additionally, in May 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 into law, making the bill “the most significant trade
secret reform in almost two decades.”72 Receiving overwhelming bipartisan
support in both the House and the Senate, only two elected officials voted

Id.
Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. (citing the UTSA).
71 VOTE Act of 2016, H.R. 5131, 114th Cong. (2016) (emphasis added). However, there have
been bills introduced to require States to implement paper trails and other audit features which
have received substantial support regardless of party; see generally The Voter Confidence and
Increased Accessibility Act of 2005, H.R. 550, 109th Cong. (2005).
72 Ehab Samuel, What The Defend Trade Secrets Act Means for Businesses, LAW 360 (May 11, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/791617/what-the-defend-trade-secrets-act-means-for-businesses.
67
68
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against the bill.73 Rather than preempting the variable trade secret laws amongst
states which primarily follow the UTSA, The Defend Trade Secrets Act
essentially creates a federal civil cause of action for the theft of trade secrets and
adds additional layers of federal protection for individuals seeking to protect
their works under trade secrets laws.74 Therefore, the solution to potential
electronic voting machine malfunctioning is unlikely to be resolved by
Congress. Rather, their willful ignorance of a widely recognized electoral issue
exacerbates the already prevalent problems with holding electronic voting
system manufacturers accountable.
C. PRESENT RELEVANCE

Concerns with the integrity, accuracy, and security of the various electronic
voting machines have been exacerbated by recent events in the 2016
presidential election cycle, namely the outside-hackings of the Democratic
National Committee (DNC), Republican National Committee (RNC), and
Russia’s alleged attempts to intervene in the election cycle. These concerns are
exacerbated when reports surfaced that “[n]early half of the states in the U.S.
have recently had their voter registration systems targeted by foreign hackers,
and four of those systems have successfully been breached.”75 In an interview
with NPR, President Obama promised to take action against Russia for their
attempts to influence the 2016 presidential election.76 Meanwhile President
Trump unequivocally has voiced his discontent with the accuracy of the
intelligence reports, believing that the same individuals within the CIA are
attempting to “delegitimize” his presidency.77 However, despite his reasons for
withholding approval of the intelligence reports, President Trump repeatedly
called the 2016 general election “rigged,” casting considerable concern over the
legitimacy of what has been perceived as the most unique presidential election

73 Id. (stating that the vote in the House voting for the Bill was 410–2, and the vote in the
Senate was 87–0).
74 Id.
75 Mike Levine & Pierre Thomas, Russian Hackers Targeted Nearly Half of States’ Voter Registration
Systems, Successfully Infiltrated 4, ABC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/US/russianhackers-targeted-half-states-voter-registration-systems/story?id=42435822.
76 Julie Hirschfeld Davis & David E. Sanger, Obama Says U.S. Will Retaliate for Russia’s Election
Meddling, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/us/politics/russi
a-hack-election-trump-obama.html.
77 Id.
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in recent memory.78 Those claims of “rigging” by Trump’s campaign prompted
the Carter Center, a renowned not-for-profit, nongovernmental agency that has
observed over 100 foreign elections and assisted in implementing democratic
principles, to release a statement and condemn those claims as “unfounded and
irresponsible.”79 Further analysis of recent events after the 2016 presidential
election, including actions by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) will be discussed at a later point.
The problems inherent with voting machines have not gone unnoticed by
the popular electorate in Georgia. In October 2016, two polls conducted by the
Atlanta Journal Constitution portrayed not only the historical importance of the
2016 election but also the negative attitudes voters have toward electronic
voting systems.80 In a sample size of 1,157 Georgians who were asked a
multitude of questions via telephone, 82% of respondents noted that this
election “matters a great deal” to the country’s future, and a plurality of voters
likewise expressed concern with whether their vote will be accurately counted
this year.81 Specifically, only 45% of respondents were very confident, with
33% somewhat confident, 13% not too confident, and 7% not confident at
all.82 These statistics show that a majority of voters (52%) lack a baseline level
of confidence in the current accuracy of the 2016 presidential election.83
II. BACKGROUND
Voting: integral, sacred, and a requisite premise of a democratic republic.
Ensuring that one’s voice is actually being registered is a foundational element
of a true democratic republic. Without a complete guarantee that votes are
accurately counted, representative government becomes a façade, and
accountability becomes an unattainable aim. Yet voting fraud is not a novel
dilemma. In 1932, Huey Long successfully ensured the passage of amendments
to the Louisiana Constitution that would further his financial interests.84 While
78 Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Officials Fight Donald Trump’s Claims of a Rigged Vote,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/us/politics/donald-trumpelection-rigging.html.
79 Press Release, Carter Center, Carter Center Statement on the Integrity of U.S. Elections
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/us-elections-101916.html.
80 Abt SRBI, Poll of Georgia Voters, October 2016, ATL.-J. CONST., http://www.myajc.com/octob
er-2016-poll/ (last visited July 1, 2017).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Victoria Collier, How to Rig an Election, HARPERS M AG. (Nov. 2012), http://harpers.org/archi
ve/2012/11/how-to-rig-an-election/1/.
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acting as Governor of Louisiana, Long was unafraid to threaten and intimidate
state legislators with diminished funding to their parishes if his policy objectives
were not passed.85 Long was eventually caught, and 513 election officials were
indicted.86 However, he utilized the Louisiana legislature to modify “the state’s
election law, giving ex post facto protection to the [election officials].”87
Fast-forward sixteen years. Then-Congressman Lyndon Johnson faced a
difficult primary opponent to the United States Senate.88 Three significant
events occurred in this race. In the initial primary, neither candidate was able to
reach the requisite majority of votes to be elected; however, in the subsequent
primary-runoff, Johnson was reportedly trailing by 20,000 votes with only a few
districts left uncounted.89 One district, San Antonio, had overwhelmingly voted
for his opponent in the initial primary by a ratio of 2:1; yet, Johnson carried San
Antonio by over 10,000 votes that night.90 Furthermore, rural counties in the
Rio Grande Valley heavily voted for Johnson, diminishing his opponent’s lead
to a seemingly close margin victory of 854 votes.91 However, the next day,
election officials “discovered” a new and uncounted precinct.92 To complicate
matters further, the Rio Grande Valley districts not only returned more ballots,
they then corrected those returns, adequately ensuring Johnson received enough
votes to be elected.93
A. THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

One of the most significant events questioning election integrity occurred
during the 2000 presidential election in Florida.94 The lack of sound, uniform
election procedures across Florida contributed significantly to the election day
debacle.95 Individuals were regularly denied access to the polls throughout the
state, ranging from misidentification issues labeling potential voters as “felons”

Id.
Id.
87 Id.
88 Martin Tolchin, How Johnson Won Election He’d Lost, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1990), http://
www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/us/how-johnson-won-election-he-d-lost.html.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Philips, supra note 24, at 1125.
95 Rights Commission’s Report on Florida Election, WASH. POST (June 5, 2001), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/ccrdraft060401.htm.
85
86
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to the lack of compliance of many absentee ballots with Florida law.96
Consequently, the Commission on Civil Rights found that Florida experienced a
large “undervote”—the ballots were cast but the technology in the voting
machine failed to register the votes.97 The ballots that failed to register
contained “hanging chads,” meaning many of the ballots did not have
completely punched holes for specific candidates.98
The Commission also discovered that the governor and secretary of state
ignored mounting evidence and repeated pleas by state election officials for a
potential malfunction of their electronic voting systems.99 Further evidence, as
reported by the Commission, demonstrated that African Americans were the
most severely affected group. While accounting for 11% of the total voting-age
population in Florida, the Commission found that 54% of African American
voters were denied the ability to vote.100 Specifically, the Commission
determined the most dramatic undercount in the election was the nonexistent
ballots of the countless unknown eligible voters, who were wrongfully purged
from the voter registration polls.101
The presidential election of 2000 exhibits the potential implications for
refusing to address a real problem that may not only be affecting the accuracy
of a vote, but also potentially diminishes the influence of minority groups in the
election process.
B. THE 2002 AND 2006 ELECTIONS

“DRE systems experienced a number of problems already in the
2002 elections, and we see this only as the tip of the iceberg.”102
Despite existing since the 1970s, Direct Record Electronic Voting systems
have been increasingly utilized to combat the problems that arose with ballotvoting in the 2000 presidential election. In 2002, in response to the debacle that
96 David Barstow & Don Van Natta Jr., Examining the Vote: How Bush Took Florida: Mining the
Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/15/us/ex
amining-the-vote-how-bush-took-florida-mining-the-overseas-absentee-vote.html?_r=0.
97 See supra note 95.
98 Ari Berman, How the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter Disenfranchisement, THE
NATION (July 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-2000-election-in-florida-le
d-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenfranchisement/.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Verified Voting Foundation, http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.source.php?sourceID
=000961 (last visited July 1, 2017).
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occurred in the 2000 presidential election, Congress passed the aforementioned
HAVA, funneling over three billion dollars to incentivize states to upgrade their
voting technology by utilizing electronic voting machines.103 These systems
were in effect in Florida’s 13th Congressional District during the 2006 election
cycle.104 Ironically enough, Kathrine Harris, the former Secretary of State for
Florida during the 2000 presidential election, decided to leave her seat, and a
hard-fought and tight race ensued between Democrat Christine Jennings and
Republican Vernon Buchanan.105 On the night of the election, Buchanan won
by a slim margin of less than 400 votes.106 However, election officials soon
discovered that 18,000 voters had seemingly not voted in that specific
congressional race in the 13th District despite voting for candidates running for
the United States Senate.107 The large undervote occurred despite election
officials receiving advanced reports during early voting that the electronic
voting systems were regularly failing to register ballots properly in the
Overall, the undervoting figure accounted for
congressional race.108
approximately 13% of individuals who voted on Election Day and 17% of
individuals who took part in early voting.109
The 13th Congressional District utilized an ES&S (DRE) voting system.110
Manufacturers of this system, perhaps in their effort to safeguard their own
credibility and legitimacy, inserted software which forced a voter to verify all of
their votes at the end in a type of “summary” page, including the display of “no
selection made” in red letters if the voter failed to vote for a contest.111 But this
was not a VVPT—a voter could navigate away from the “warning screen” by
simply, either knowingly or unintentionally, confirming their options.112
Florida election officials had been made aware of the issues with the
machines from ES&S, identifying problems with delayed responses which
varied across each terminal and could not be remedied without a software
update—an update promised but which never occurred before the 2006

Reddix-Smalls, supra note 55, at 702.
Jessica Amunson & Sam Hirsch, The Case of the Disappearing Votes: Lessons from the Jennings v.
Buchanan Congressional Election Contest, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 397, 400–07 (2008).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 398.
107 Id. at 398–99.
108 Id. at 399; see Todd Ruger, Voting Glitch Prompts Warning, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 5,
2006, at B1.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 400.
111 Id. at 107.
112 Id. at 401.
103
104
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November general election.113 Jennings filed suit in Florida and moved for the
Circuit Court to allow him to access the ES&S source code, which would allow
experts to examine the software and determine if any malfunctioning
occurred.114 However, Florida’s evidence code provided for “a trade-secret
privilege.”115 Under this law, “a person has the privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent other persons from disclosing, a trade secret owned by that
person if the allowance of the privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise work
injustice.”116 Claiming this protection was unprecedented, and in a trade secrets
dispute, the plaintiff must have a “reasonable necessity for the requested
materials.”117 ES&S had the burden to show “good cause for protecting or
limiting discovery by demonstrating that . . . disclosure may be harmful.”118
Following an evidentiary hearing on the determination of Jennings’ “reasonable
necessity” for discovery, the Circuit Court Judge denied access to the ES&S
software, reasoning that it would “result in destroying or at least gutting the
protections afforded those who own the trade secrets.”119
Despite the general consensus amongst experts, researchers, and academics
in the political science field that if the votes had been accurately counted
Jennings would have won by 3,000 votes, Jennings was unable to legally compel
discovery of the ES&S Software.120 As two commentators noted, Judge Gary
essentially concluded that the public’s right to know what happened in the
election was subordinate to ES&S’s trade secret privilege.121 Despite Florida
law requiring a manual recount because Buchanan won by less than 1%, there
was no “paper trail” incorporated into the electoral practice in that district; thus,
if Jennings was unable to prove malfunctioning because of the trade-secret
privilege granted to ES&S, she was left without a remedy to prove machine
error.122 The practical effect left voters in Florida’s 13th Congressional District
contemplating whether the correct individual was representing their interests in
the House of Representatives.
Id.
Id. at 405–06.
115 Id. at 407.
116 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (2006).
117 Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Inc., 770 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
118 Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Cruz, 761 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
119 Amunson & Hirsch, supra note 104, at 410 (citing Order on Motions at 3, Jennings, No.
2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531).
120 Id. at 413.
121 Id. at 410.
122 Id.
113
114
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In 2002, Georgia and Alabama also allegedly experienced reliability issues
with their electronic voting machines. In Georgia, both three-time incumbent
State Senator Max Cleland and Governor Roy Barnes were defeated in their bid
for re-election.123 Georgia utilized the Diebold voting machines.124 The
outcome was unexpected, and a whistle-blower conceded that the machines had
recently received undisclosed software patches.125 However, they were installed
incredibly late in the process and did not abide by Georgia law that required
these patches be certified by the state.126
Because of much criticism revolving around its voting machines used in
elections such as 2000 Presidential Election and 2002 Georgia Gubernatorial and
Senate Races, Diebold initially attempted to retain its reputation by creating a
subsidiary “Premier” for election products.127 However, it then distanced itself
from being in the electoral field, and recently sold its subsidiary.128 But the lesson
from Georgia is clear and only advances proponents’ remedies: scrutinize all the
software and, at bare minimum, have a contingency plan in place.129
Similar to the experiences of both Governor Barnes and Senator Cleland,
Governor Don Siegelman (D) believed he had won re-election in the 2002
Alabama gubernatorial race. However, Baldwin County, a primarily republican
district, reported that a glitch had given 6,000 additional votes to Siegelman.130
Additionally, evidence existed that the machine might have been hacked and
tampered with to skew the results.131
According to a 2005 Congressional report, this computerized method of
voting is now the most popular voting method in the United States.132 While
the report determined that the DREs did not pose a significant threat to
electoral legitimacy at the time, the authors explicitly stated concerns about “the

123 Adam Cohen, A Tale of Three (Electronic Voting) Elections, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/opinion/31observer.html.
124 Id.; see also Diebold Voting Machine President Personally Delivered a Secret, Illegal Software Update,
NATIONAL ELECTION DEFENSE COALITION, https://www.electiondefense.org/georgia-2002-1/
(last visited July 1, 2017).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Diebold Exits Voting Machine Business, CBS NEWS (Sept. 4, 2009, 12:54 PM), http://www.cbs
news.com/news/diebold-exits-voting-machine-business/.
128 Id.
129 Cohen, supra note 123.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Fischer & Coleman, supra note 16,
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lack of information about DRE security, especially in relation to other systems
and other components of election integrity.”133
C. COMMUNITY ACTIVISM

In 2006, Mr. David Mills, an attorney and registered voter in Shelby County,
Tennessee, challenged the constitutionality of electronic voting machines under
both the Tennessee Constitution and United States Constitution.134 Shelby
County required its citizens to vote on electronic voting machines which did
not produce a VVPT or any similar record of the vote that individual casted.135
In addition, if a discrepancy occurred and a voter wished to verify the candidate
they voted for, poll workers had no ability “to review a questionable vote and
determine the intent of the voter.”136 Mr. Mills’ primary concern with
electronic voting machines revolved around verifiable data surrounding the
election that would be able to be accessed in the case of a recount, but because
Tennessee didn’t mandate VVPT, his vote was diminished in comparison to
other counties that provided paper ballots.137 The Court failed to agree, holding
that there was insufficient evidence that the electronic voting machines utilized
in Shelby County were disenfranchising voters.138 The Court allowed the
continued use of the electronic voting machines because of the deference
provided to legislatures in creating election systems.139 In addition, because the
voter has no right to a “perfect voting system” and adequate safeguards exist to
guard against malfunction, the electronic voting systems in place are sufficient
mediums for recording and tabulating votes.140
Furthermore, in 2006, Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich, a long-time
supporter of the Diebold electronic voting machines used in his state, called for
a paper ballot requirement.141 Other states such as Georgia and Florida are
considering sweeping changes to the way their machines are utilized and
regulated.142
Id.
Mills v. Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n, 218 S.W.3d 33, 34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
135 Id. at 35.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 40.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 41 (citing Mooney v. Phillips, 118 S.W.2d 224, 226 (1938)).
140 Id. at 41–42.
141 Election Reform Malfunction and Malfeasance: A Report on the Electronic Voting Debacle,
COMMON CAUSE (2005), http://www.commoncause.org/research-reports/National_062206_Ma
lfuntion_and_Malfeasance_Report.pdf.
142 Id. at 16.
133
134
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Unsurprisingly, Hollywood did not miss the opportunity to dramatize public
concern with the vote integrity throughout the early 2000s. Two significant
movies, Recount (2008) and Man of the Year (2006), depicted the harsh reality
of the reliability of unregulated electronic voting systems. Produced by HBO,
Recount is a dramatized account of Bush v. Gore and dives into the key criticisms
of the election: hanging chads, differing electoral policies, and partisan biases.
Kevin Spacey plays Ron Klain, a key democratic strategist and trusted advisor
to Democratic Presidential Candidate Al Gore. The movie portrays a legal
sparring match between James Baker, played by Tom Wilkinson, and Kevin
Spacey’s Ron Klain and highlights critical moments of the campaign, including
the moment the Supreme Court ruled against Gore.143
In Man of the Year (2006), Robin Williams plays a comedian who is convinced
to run for president and surprisingly wins—but only because the fictional
electronic voting machine company, Delacroy, manipulated the results to ensure
his victory.144 To many there was little doubt that “Delacroy” symbolized the
election disasters “Diebold” experienced in the elections around that time.145
D. THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

In 2012, electronic voting machines reportedly caused issues in
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia.146 A video from a polling
location in Pennsylvania showed voting machines “flipping” a vote from
Obama to Romney.147 Machine breakdowns in Virginia caused up to five hour
delays at the voting precincts, and South Carolina reported similar
malfunctioning with their own electronic voting systems.148
Despite an academic emphasis on the negligent maintenance and unreliable
nature of these machines, the mere potential of outside hacking and
manipulation remains possible. In August 2016, the DHS contemplated
whether to add the United States election system to its list of entities (such as
143 See Roger Ebert, Recount, ROGER EBERT: REVIEWS (May 25, 2008), http://www.rogerebert.
com/reviews/recount-2008.
144 David Weigel, The Forgettable Liberal Politics of Robin Williams, SLATE (Aug. 12, 2014, 10:56
AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2014/08/12/the_forgettable_liberal_politics_of_robi
n_williams.html.
145 Marybeth Kuznik, Movie Review: Man of the Year, VOTEPA.US, http://www.votepa.us/news/
past-milestones/2006/movie-review-man-year (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
146 Mark Clayton, Voting-Machine Glitches: How Bad Was It on Election Day Around the Country?,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/201
2/1107/Voting-machine-glitches-How-bad-was-it-on-Election-Day-around-the-country.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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the already-present power grid and financial institutions) needing protection
from cybersecurity attacks.149 Jeh Johnson, then-Secretary of Homeland
Security, noted that his department was “actively thinking” about the additional
cybersecurity protections.150
Despite the Secretary’s rhetoric about preventing outside hacking in elections,
the DHS was recently accused of attempting to bypass Georgia’s protected
electoral database firewall without authorization by Secretary of State of Georgia
Brian Kemp.151 Soon thereafter, the DHS decided to classify the electoral system
as “critical infrastructure.”152 Despite DHS rightly acting to protect the integrity
of elections, it was already too late to enact adequate safeguards and protections
in the 2016 election cycle. However, President Obama reiterated that there
existed no credible evidence of outside vote tampering.153
Yet the potential ease in tampering with these machines is incredibly
concerning. In 2007, a group of researchers at Princeton University hacked into
a Diebold electronic voting machine and successfully changed the voting results
by inserting certain software into the voting machine.154 One year later, the
same researchers only took seven minutes to install a computer program in an
electronic voting machine “that steals votes from one party’s candidates, and
gives them to another.”155 That machine that was hacked was manufactured by
Sequoia Advantage.156 Presently, according to Roger Johnson, head of the
vulnerability assessment team at Argonne National Laboratory, the Sequoia
Advantage machine is used “in at least six states by 9 million voters,” and the
Diebold machine are “used in at least 20 states by 21 million voters.”157

149 Nicole Ogrysko, DHS Considers Adding Election System as Critical Cyber Infrastructure, FED.
NEWS RADIO (Aug. 3, 2016, 4:40 PM), http://federalnewsradio.com/cybersecurity/2016/08/dhs
-considers-adding-election-system-critical-cyber-infrastructure/.
150 Id.
151 Byron Tau, Georgia Says Someone in U.S. Government Tried to Hack State’s Computers Housing
Voter Data, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2016, 6:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/georgia-reports-at
tempt-to-hack-states-election-database-via-ip-address-linked-to-homeland-security-1481229960.
152 Eric Geller, State Officials Blast ‘Unprecedented’ DHS Move to Secure Electoral System, POLITICO
(Jan. 9, 2017, 11:03 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/state-electoral-system-hackin
g-homeland-security-233349.
153 Id.
154 Gerry Smith, Electronic Voting Machines Still Widely Used Despite Security Concerns, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 22, 2012, 3:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/electronic-votingmachines-2012_n_1992992.html.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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E. THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

In November 2016 Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in a tight contest
to become the forty-sixth President of the United States. President Trump was
initially declared the clear winner, but in a number of jurisdictions, various
electronic voting systems errors consequently led to profoundly long lines.
In Pennsylvania, four counties reported problems with a total of twenty-five
electronic voting machines.158 Many Republicans, Democrats, and computer
scientists concede that problems with the aging machines are common in
Pennsylvania, but the state’s top election official, Pedro Cortes, declared that,
regardless of the problems that occurred with the machines, “it appears that no
votes were cast inaccurately and no voters were disenfranchised.”159 However,
in Pennsylvania’s Butler, Lebanon, Luzerne, and Westmoreland counties,
Republicans reported that their votes for Trump flipped to Hillary Clinton—a
tough reality exacerbated by the notion that these counties do not utilize paper
trails thus making it impossible to perform a post-election audit.160 Specifically,
in Westmoreland County, GOP chairman Michael Korns stated in an interview
“that about a dozen voting machines were taken offline because they had been
recording votes for Clinton that had been intended for Trump.”161
Furthermore, North Carolina experienced such widespread problems with
their electronic voting systems that they made the decision to keep polls open in
eight precincts in Durham County for between twenty and sixty minutes “to
check in voters manually.”162 Specifically, election officials in Durham County
experienced issues consisting of “software malfunctions with the laptops used
to verify voter registration.”163 Counties were forced to switch to paper rolls,
and at one precinct, voting stopped for two hours when the election site ran out
of forms.164 Nearly 40% of Durham residents are African Americans—a
county which voted overwhelmingly for President Obama in 2012.165 A similar
experience occurred in Charlotte, where one individual attempted to vote for

158 Darren Samuelsohn et al., Trump Seizes on Isolated Glitches to Fuel ‘Rigged’ Election Claims,
POLITICO (Nov. 18, 2016, 3:30 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/2016-election-glit
ches-trump-230953.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Mark Abadi, Widespread Voting Problems Were Reported in a Critical Swing State, BUS. INSIDER (Nov.
8, 2016, 3:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/north-carolina-voting-problems-2016-11.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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Republican Donald Trump on his machine up to fifteen times before it finally
registered.166
In Washington County, Utah, election officials endured problems with
getting the electronic voting machines operational after they failed to work
properly when the polls opened.167 Utah Director of Elections Mark Thomas
noted that the machines experienced programming errors.168 Overall, only
ninety-nine out of the 380 machines allegedly had their memory cards
programmed properly, and voters were given paper ballots instead.169 In
Detroit, Michigan, voters were delayed when the machine which counted
ballots malfunctioned at the beginning of Election Day.170 Voters were told to
leave their ballots in a secure box or wait for a technician to arrive to address
the problem.171
Not long after confirmation of 2016 election results, Green Party Candidate
Jill Stein launched a recount effort in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin,
citing critical flaws in the states’ electronic voting systems for reliability and
accurately verifying votes.172 Dr. Stein was successful in obtaining a recount in
Wisconsin, but President Trump remained the winner.173 Meanwhile, Michigan
began the recount until a lower court in Michigan halted the recount, and a
federal judge declined Stein’s request for a recount in Pennsylvania.174
III. ANALYSIS
Presently, trade secret law protects electronic voting machine manufacturers
from the forces disclosure of their proprietary information to the public,
regardless of the likelihood that a particular machine malfunctioned.
Consequently, the machines cannot be audited to determine their accuracy and
reliability, thus incentivizing companies to hide their errors and mistakes, or as
Id.
Richard Wolf & Kevin McCoy, Voters in Key States Endured Long Lines, Equipment Failures,
USA TODAY (Nov. 9, 2016, 1:09 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/electio
ns/2016/11/08/voting-polls-election-day/93201770/.
168 Associated Press, Malfunctioning Voting Machines Prompt Switch to Paper Ballots in Southern Utah,
GLOBAL NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016, 5:42 PM), http://globalnews.ca/news/3053885/utah-voting-mach
ine-malfunctions-prompt-switch-to-paper-ballots/.
169 See Wolf & McCoy, supra note 167.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Daniel Marans, What Jill Stein’s Recount Effort Actually Accomplished, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
12, 2016, 6:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jill-stein-election-recount_us_58507
032e4b092f08685ff68.
173 Id.
174 Id.
166
167
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mentioned previously, to attempt to patch the software glitches without notice
to the individual state.175
A. CALLS FOR REMEDIES

Many keen observers of the electoral process have identified substantive
errors with these machines and have called for procedural reform in the manner
electronic voting systems are regulated and utilized. Remedies such as paper
auditing, changing the optics in the machines, and the creation of a federal
election commission which produces mandatory, rather than the voluntary
guidelines proffered by the HAVA-created EAC.176
Another possible solution has been called the “No Government Trade
Secrets Solution” where it is declared that a government trade secret “in any
context is little more than a legal fiction, [and] trade secrecy theory and
application are clarified and transparency, accountability, and deliberative
democracy are not curtailed by trade secrecy.”177 Essentially, this remedy calls
for vitiating electronic voting system manufacturers’ objections and mandatory
disclosure of their proprietary software, simply because the law would eliminate
government trade secrets.178 Proponents argue this bright-line rule, or lack
thereof, facilitates a more transparent and accountable process.179 A voting
system manufacturer wishing to maintain their competitive edge in the industry
would seek protection under patent law instead, and the information filed in the
patent would be openly disclosed to the public after eighteen months, thereby
alleviating any concerns inherent with non-disclosure of integral election
software.180 Yet, with the aforementioned recent support by Republicans for
increased trade secret protections, their ability to retain control of both the
House and the Senate, and the recent presidential election of Republican
President Donald Trump, government trade secrets are unlikely to be
completely nullified—even through a patent remedy.
Commentators have likewise advocated for the use of liberal discovery.181
For example, in Georgia, trial judges in contested-election cases have “the
power to do everything ‘necessary and proper’ to expeditiously hear and resolve

Amunson & Hirsch, supra note 104.
Philips, supra note 24, at 1158–60.
177 David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 107
(2011).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 108.
181 See Amunson & Hirsch, supra note 104, at 418.
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the dispute, including ‘to compel the production of evidence which may be
required at such hearing.’ ”182 Similarly, in statewide elections, Illinois provides
plaintiffs with the ability to request the examination of “records and equipment
under the control of an election authority.”183 However, the competing
concern that, “[i]n some circumstances, there may be risks to the electoral
system itself if voting-machine source code becomes widely available” will likely
ensure that election-contest statutes are not construed liberally to include
proprietary software under federal trade secret protections.184 Without the
federal government’s implicit consent of vitiating some protections inherent
with federal trade secrets, state judges are unlikely to allow liberal discovery.
B. THE PAPER AUDIT (VVPT) REMEDY

A potential solution to deficiencies in the electronic voting systems could
require Congress to mandate uniform paper auditing (i.e., VVPT), thereby
instructing the voting machine issue the voter with a paper receipt indicating
how each vote was cast. However, in the absence of procedures for observing
the open source software within the electronic voting systems, VVPTs are
unlikely to provide little assurance to vote integrity, masking the potential future
malfunctions in a façade of transparency.
Paper audits have increasingly gained traction in states that attempt to
reform their electronic voting systems, implementing audit procedures where
votes are hand-counted on paper records and comparing them to originally
recorded vote counts.185 Acting largely as a prophylactic, these procedures are
generally implemented via state legislation and require variable mandatory audits
of a small percentage of votes cast.186 Only sixteen states do not have paper
auditing policies in place.187 Because of the unwillingness of Congress to
address the insufficiencies with electronic voting systems, states have widely
implemented variable auditing policies and safeguards to preserve public
confidence in the electoral system, whether codified by statute, existing as a
policy or directive, as is the case in California, or providing a foundation which

Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 21-2-525(b) (2008)).
Id. (citing 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.6a (West 2003)).
184 Id.
185 Post Election Audits, VERIFIED VOTING, https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/post-el
ection-audits/ (last visited July 1, 2017).
186 Id.
187 Editorial: Electronic Voting is the Real Threat to Elections, USA TODAY (Sept. 19, 2012, 8:45 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/2012-09-19/electronic-votingfraud-security/57809062/1.
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differs by population in each county.188 Yet, a prophylactic only masks the
potential software issues within these machines, and if doubts remain to both
the integrity of these electronic voting machine manufacturers and their
machines, a VVPT installed by these manufacturers provides little assurance of
accuracy and reliability in one’s vote.
During the 2016 legislative session, the North Carolina General Assembly
passed HB 836 which defines a ballot “as a paper document marked by a voter
either by hand or electronically,” meaning that the over 300 iVotronic machines
currently in use in Brunswick and Pender Counties will be non-compliant
because the machines do not produce a ballot.189
Another swing state, Virginia, does not implement any auditing
procedures.190 Florida, while implementing an auditing procedure in 2007,
audits only one randomly selected election contest which is selected separately
in each county.191 Pennsylvania instituted an audit requirement for 2% of the
votes cast or 2000 votes, whichever is the lesser.192 In addition, California,
whose statutes and policies often blaze a trail and provide a sound model, only
requires a hand count of ballots of 1% of precincts in each jurisdiction.193
Meanwhile, in Connecticut, the General Assembly codified mandatory use of
paper ballots and manual audits.194 During each election, 10% of voting
districts in Connecticut are randomly selected, and state officials conduct a hand
count of the ballots.195
Imagine a grocery store in the early morning. Joe is standing in line, waiting
patiently for the teenager at the cash register to slowly finish with the elderly
lady in front of him. Joe’s responsibilities and obligations begin to race through
his mind, and he realizes he is going to be late for work. He still needs to fill up
on gas, grab breakfast for the family, and take the dog outside. But finally, it is
his turn. He hurriedly loads the items on the conveyor belt, pays for his
purchase, takes his receipt, and rushes out the store.

Id.
Adam Wagner, 2015 Legislation in North Carolina Bans Strictly Electronic Voting Machine,
WILMINGTON STAR-NEWS (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/policy/2015-Legislation-inNorth-Carolina-Bans-Strictly-Electronic-Voting-Machine.html.
190 See id.; Post Election Audits, supra note 186.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Suzanne Mello-Stark, Some States – Including Swing States – Have Flawed Voting Systems, VOX
(Nov. 3, 2016, 7:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/11/1/13486386/election-rigg
ed-paper-trail-audit.
195 Id.
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Now imagine that grocery store is a voting precinct, and the cashier is a
volunteer election official. Arguably, the precinct also retains a copy of the
receipt and has the ability to verify votes. The problem with VVPTs is
axiomatic—a collective electorate cannot rely on individual voters to actually
look at their receipt, or even for a volunteer election official to ensure each
voter confirms their receipt. While VVPTs certainly diminish fear, they fail to
provide complete transparency. Unless guided by electoral requirements or
state statutes, the need to actually compare paper audits with the voting
system’s record is compelling evidence of corrupted software. If the software
within an electronic voting system is, for example, “flipping votes,” how can
voters place complete trust in the VVPT feature if the software has been
demonstrated to be corrupted?196
While these policies do assist in reassuring the public in the integrity of the
electoral system, they do little more than divert public attention from the real
problem: the auditing of the software. Thus, broadening the scope of auditing
paper ballots and proposals to implement them further do little more than
facilitate an unverifiable electoral system that promotes convenience over
reliability.
C. THE LITIGANT’S SOLUTION: BURDEN SHIFTING

Past attempts at remedying the problems inherent with electronic voting
systems have been met without success. The aforementioned remedies focus
on legislation, ranging from the creation of a new commission to the complete
nullification of government trade secrets.
Yet, scholars and political
commentators have failed to recognize an additional avenue for expanding
access to the software within the machines: the practice of burden shifting. In
legal issues revolving around compliance with Environmental and
Administrative laws, burden shifting is commonly practiced.
Typically, a party bringing litigation has the burden of production and
persuasion to produce evidence supporting its claim. In McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, the Supreme Court deviated from that norm and created the burdenshifting framework which governs in employment discrimination claims.197 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that it was the “purpose of Congress to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
Reddix-Smalls, supra note 55, at 704.
Adam Kielich, The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework, THE KIELICH LAW FIRM,
http://www.kielichlawfirm.com/the-mcdonnell-douglas-burden-shifting-framework/ (last visited
July 14, 2017) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
196
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environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”198 Similar to electronic
voting system cases where the plaintiff is unable to survive a motion for
summary judgment because of the lack of knowledge of particularized evidence
as a result of trade secret protection, many employment discrimination claims
likewise fail to make it to trial.199 Rather than force the party bringing the claim
to engage in extensive and time-consuming discovery to find evidence to
support their claim, the burden-shifting framework “shifts the burden to the
employer to produce a nondiscriminatory reason. . . . [before] it shifts the
burden back to the employee-plaintiff to disprove the alleged nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer’s conduct.”200
The McDonnell Douglas framework requires three prongs be met:
(1) The plaintiff must plead and prove a prima facie case of
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) The
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its conduct; [and] (3)
The burden of production shifts back to the employee to prove
the employer’s provided motive is pretext for discriminatory
conduct.201
Usually, the plaintiff bringing the action belongs to a protected group, and the
framework is typically utilized in cases where the plaintiff’s assertions are based
on circumstantial evidence.202
Burden shifting has likewise been a mechanism used to lower the evidentiary
burden inherent in cases involving environmental law. Plaintiffs struggled to
overcome significant evidentiary burdens in order to maintain a claim, such as
proving, for example, that a pollutant injured not only the individual bringing
the claim but also the wider public in general.203 This problem was exacerbated
by the lack of uniform federal standards for regulating pollution and thus a
heavy burden on parties seeking to protect the environment.204 States were
likewise unwilling to impose additional environmental protections in fear that
their state would suffer consequences from big businesses which opposed
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
See Kielich, supra note 198.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Martin H. Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980’s: Shifting Back the Burden of Proof, 12
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 6 (1984).
204 Id. at 10.
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reform.205 Furthermore, in each different locality, variable environmental laws
were in effect; therefore, activists had to begin anew when seeking
environmental protections in different places.206 With increased public focus
on environmental concerns, Congress finally began to pass legislation
addressing critical environmental concerns, reasoning that “private litigation
would not solve pollution problems [and] that state efforts were inadequate.”207
This should sound familiar.
To diminish the public’s involuntary contact with harmful toxins and
pollutants, California passed the “Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986,” shifting the burden to manufacturers and businesses to give
“clear and reasonable warning” to anyone exposed to known cancerous or toxic
chemicals.208 California delegated the regulation of those warnings to its Office
of Environmental Health and Hazard Assessment which established thresholds
to determine the significance of risk standards.209 Thus, the burden rests on
these manufacturers to provide adequate data demonstrating their compliance
with those standards.210
California has utilized burden-shifting in other toxic tort contexts.211 The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) did not expressly provide for a burden-shifting mechanism, but
courts have interpreted the law in that manner.212 Once the plaintiff establishes
that a defendant is a person falling within the ambit of liability in the Act, the
defendant bears the complete “burden of disproving that its actions resulted in
a release of hazardous substances.”213
Burden-shifting wouldn’t completely vitiate an electronic voting system
manufacturer’s trade secret—it would solely entail releasing enough
information, protected by the safety of an in camera inspection, to alleviate any
concern of specific malfunctioning with these machines. Likewise, because all
machines are built with the same optics and presumably receive the same
software updates, manufacturers would be incentivized to keep detail data logs
of software patches and ensure uniform compliance with those standards.
Burden-shifting would provide the best opportunity for ensuring the accuracy
Id.
Id.
207 Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 89, 137 (2005) (citing Cal. Health-Safety Code 25249.6 (2004)).
208 Id. at 137 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (2004)).
209 Id. at 138.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 139.
213 Id. at 140.
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of an election while simultaneously minimizing the trade secret infringement
upon a manufacture—an infringement which should be encouraged in light of
these manufacturers profiting on our democratic process.
D. THE 2016 RECOUNT: VOTING SYSTEMS AND ELECTION INTEGRITY

As evidenced by Stein’s 2016 recount efforts and previously discussed
voting system issues beginning in the early 2000’s, most electoral cases of fraud
and other computer irregularities are filed under state election laws rather than
under federal statute.214 These suits are often filed by losing candidates and
seek recounts or new elections.215
While many different events leading to litigation over electronic voting
systems were introduced earlier in this Note, perhaps the best example of a
standard which could be utilized lies in Ohio common law. In November 1990,
a tightly contested race in the state’s attorney general race was determined by
“less than one-quarter of one percent.”216 The losing candidate filed suit,
alleging that the optical scanning machines in one county were poorly
maintained and “in such [a state of] disrepair.”217 Furthermore, these machines
were alleged to have recorded more votes than were actually recorded in the
poll books.218
Determining it was bound by stringent Ohio precedent, the court required
the losing candidate to prove two facts: “(1) that one or more election
irregularities occurred, and (2) that the irregularity or irregularities affected
enough votes to change or make uncertain the result of the election” by clear
and convincing evidence.219 The court determined that the losing candidate’s
conclusory allegations that several optical scanning machines either failed to
record a vote or the machine’s outright rejection failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence “that an irregularity occurred.”220 However, the losing
candidate was successful in proving a discrepancy of the poll books as an
irregularity by clear and convincing evidence, but he nonetheless failed to prove
the second prong.221 Consequently, the court determined the irregularity did

See Philips, supra note 24, at 1154.
Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. (alteration in original).
218 Id.
219 In re Election of November 6, 1990 for Office of Attorney General, 569 N.E.2d 447, 448
(Ohio 1991).
220 Id. at 459.
221 Id. at 463.
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not directly influence the outcome of the election, and the losing candidate was
left without a remedy.222
More recent efforts have met similar ends. While Stein eventually failed in
her attempts for a recount in Pennsylvania, United States District Court Judge
Diamond delivered a detailed thirty-one-page opinion outlining his reason for
denying Stein’s motion.223 Stein alleged that, while the electronic voting systems
identified Donald Trump as the winner, he failed to receive a majority vote
from Pennsylvania citizens.224 Seeking to review, among other requests, the
electronic voting systems in six different counties, Stein presented an expert
witness and four affidavits from experts exhibiting the vulnerability of these
electronic voting systems.225 Denying the motion, Judge Diamond labeled
Stein’s claims as outrageous and unnecessary.226
Stein’s suit in Michigan met a similar fate. In the initial suit, Dr. Stein sought
a preliminary injunction for certification of Michigan’s results in order to
conduct a recount.227 Granting the request, Judge Goldsmith recognized the
likelihood of irreparable harm voters in Pennsylvania could experience if results
were not completely accurate, noting that a fair and accurate vote is the
“bedrock of our nation.”228 Judge Goldsmith later dissolved the injunction,
rejecting Dr. Stein’s allegations of vulnerable electronic voting machines in
Pennsylvania.229 Stein, according to Judge GoldSmith, had not presented
“evidence of tampering or mistake” but rather asserted speculative allegations
about the “mere potentiality” of an unfairly conducted vote.230
E. PROPOSING A BURDEN-SHIFTING STANDARD

The standard cited by the Ohio Supreme Court, while not primarily utilized
as a burden-shifting statute, provides a practical and easily applicable standard
for use in electronic voting system litigation. This Note will evaluate three
elements critical to the burden shifting analysis.
1. Occurrence of Irregularities. As both Judge Goldsmith and Judge Diamond
exhibited in their recent decisions to deny Dr. Stein’s recount efforts, specific
evidence of corrupted or malfunctioning software is required to maintain a
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230

Id.
Id.
Stein v. Cortés, No. 16-6287 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2016) (Westlaw).
Id. at *8, *29.
Id. at *31.
Stein v. Thomas, No. 16-14233 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
Id. at 5.
Stein, No. 16014233, at 7.
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claim.231 While specific evidence of wrongdoing ensures that voting system
manufacturers do not spend the entirety of their time in Court, the evidentiary
burdens experienced by litigants in conjunction with the trade secret laws which
protect these manufacturers essentially ensure that these manufacturers remain
unaccountable to public voters.
In light of the legal restrictions imposed by both state and federal trade
secret law, courts should utilize a more pragmatic approach and recognize that
plaintiffs will often cite specific errors with the software in the machine. Yet
mere inability to initially observe the software to determine the true nature of
the problem should not diminish the public importance of a definitive
understanding of the legitimacy of an election. Specific circumstances can show
a court by clear and convincing evidence that irregularities occurred in these
voting systems.
As previously discussed, substantial occurrences of “undervoting” and
“overvoting” at specific polling precincts provide a significant lapse in trust
with the voting systems. While voting is anonymous, it surely may be presumed
that, for example, 18,000 voters would cast a vote in the race for a
congressional seat.232 The results exhibit a potential devastating issue with the
counting mechanisms, and it is difficult to conceive a rational argument for a
different source of the problem.
Furthermore, verifiable instances of actual machine malfunctioning should
give cause for courts to probe further for information on the operation of
affected voting systems. Lawyers may litigate the facts and repeated occurrence
of electronic voting system malfunctioning by, for example, showing that
“flipping” votes unquestionably increases the likelihood of machine error.
Unconceivably, in both the 2012 and 2016 presidential election, despite
substantial media scrutiny on the errors of these voting systems, the significance
of these events have gone unnoticed (or likely ignored) by Congress, state
legislatures, and courts.233
2. Effect on the Outcome of the Election. Perhaps a fear of opponents to trade
secret reform or the utilization of burden-shifting fear that increased access to
the courts and the potential flood of litigation should deter a remedy that, while
better guaranteeing accurate electoral results, would make the voting process
much more bureaucratic. But a key idea of a true democracy should not be
solely concerned with efficiency. Elections are important enough to subvert the

231 See Stein v. Cortes, No. 16-6287, at 24-6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2016); Stein v. Thomas, No. 1614233, at 6–7 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
232 See Amunson & Hirsch, supra note 104, at 400.
233 See Torres, supra note 56; see also Orgysko, supra note 149.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss2/7

32

Marlow: Fundamental, Unequivocal, Yet Unreliable: The Interplay of Voting

2017] FUNDAMENTAL, UNEQUIVOCAL, YET UNRELIABLE

413

inconvenience and potential costs associated with increased access as a result of
burden-shifting.
Thus, upon a plaintiff proving the irregularities by clear and convincing
evidence, the burden should switch to the defendant manufacturer(s) to provide
tangible evidence that these machines (i) did not malfunction or (ii) did
malfunction but did not affect the outcome of the election. Despite appearing
daunting and ground-shaking, manufacturers can easily comply with the
obligation. Keep in mind that the major companies belong to an association
which promulgates guidelines and conducts independent, yet confidential,
testing.234 By compiling data on certification for the current year for the alleged
malfunctioning machine, defendant manufacturers can easily controvert
allegations by presenting this data to a court without revealing any proprietary
software which could potentially forfeit their economic benefits.235
Consequently, the ability to absolve liability with data from the independent
testing would actually ensure proper certification procedures are followed.236
3. Public Policy. When courts interpret trade secret privilege, such as Florida’s
trade secret privilege in Buchanan,237 courts often emphasize the significance of the
economic benefits from proprietary software and the potential harm a
manufacturer could endure by complying with court orders. Voting is
undoubtedly a fundamental right, and typically, when a fundamental right is
threatened, Courts have applied strict scrutiny to determine whether the State has
a narrowly tailored, compelling interest in the practice that is being challenged.
Why has such exacting scrutiny not been applied in these cases to at least fashion
a workable, adequate remedy which meets the needs of both parties?
The current unreliable and unchecked voting systems utilized in elections
represent the potential for a substantial, pervasive threat to the fundamental
right of voting. While these manufacturers are protected and enriched through
free elections, voters remain unaware of the legitimacy and credibility of an
electoral outcome. If voting truly is a fundamental right and the bedrock of our
democracy, protection of the substance must be perceived just as vital as the
ability.
Environmental law activists experienced nearly the same problems
proponents of voting system reform experience: lack of uniform federal
standards, variable treatment among states, and evidentiary concerns.238
However, a variation of burden-shifting was utilized to ensure that consumers
234
235
236
237
238
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were made aware of the cancerous and toxic materials within certain
products.239 But warnings, in the context of electronic voting systems, have
been demonstrated to fail to reach the public, and frankly, in a system where the
only accountability these manufacturers have are to each other, voters deserve
more transparency.240
IV. CONCLUSION
Election errors are not novel issues. However, a prerequisite to a
democratic republic requires free, uninhibited elections. The current electoral
climate conditions our ability to vote on an ignorance of the actual accuracy of
the instruments utilized to record that vote. Thus, while our ability to vote may
be fundamental and unequivocal, the substance of our vote—our specific
exercise of endorsement for a certain direction for this country—remains
inaccurate and consequently unreliable.
The unreliability of the electronic voting systems has been exacerbated by
the near-uniform adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, limiting
claimants’ ability to have their experts observe the machines because of the
economic benefit derived from the substantially confined knowledge of its
proprietary information.
Thus, plaintiffs have failed, ranging from the 1990 Ohio attorney general
contest to the infamous Bush-Gore Florida debacle to Dr. Jill Stein’s recount
efforts, to maintain a successful claim in holding voting system manufacturers
accountable. Requirements that plaintiffs plead specific evidence in support of
their allegations relegates many complaints to Judge Diamond’s and Judge
Goldsmith’s characterization as speculative, conclusory, and ridiculous allegations.
While previous attempts at remedying the problem, such as vitiating trade
secrets, utilization of paper audits, federally created commissions, and
independent reviews, have proven inadequate, a remedy to a problem
exacerbated by legislatures requires judicial activism; specifically, the application
of burden-shifting.
While seemingly an extraordinary standard, burden-shifting has been utilized
in environmental law and administrative law. In environmental law specifically,
activists experienced many of the same problems that proponents of increased
regulation of electronic voting systems face today: variable standards and the
lack of a ruling body. Concededly, the legislature in California initiated burdenshifting, but unlike much of the natural conflicts facilitating the laws in
239
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California, electronic voting systems are aging, developing critical flaws which
continue to surface prominently in each subsequent election. Despite the
increased media attention and academic scrutiny of these machines, legislatures
have refused to address the problem, and if they have, the perceived, ideal
remedies have been (1) to strengthen trade secret laws and (2) implement
meaningless paper audits.
Redefining the regulation of electronic voting systems requires the
intervention of the judiciary. Irregularities exist in these voting systems, but the
utilization of burden-shifting will renew faith in the electoral system by
identifying those errors while simultaneously continuing to protect the
proprietary information of these systems. Transparency does not require full
disclosure and inventory of each widget and mechanism within these systems,
but rather it requires tangible data and statistics describing the operation of
these machines. For as long as the substance of a vote remains conditional on
the pure ability of private electronic system manufacturers to make a substantial
profit on free elections, the ability to cast one is meaningless.
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